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construction of which was necessary for the determination of the
rights and liabilities of the parties. The court stated that it was
the nature of the cause of action, rather than the form of the
pleadings or the use of interpleader procedure, which determines
whether a cause is legal 9or
equitable, and correspondingly, whether
2
a jury trial is available.

In a vigorous dissent, Mr. Justice Breitel concluded that
"proceedings in the nature of interpleader, because of their origin
in equity, do not permit of a right to a jury trial. .. .,93 Also,
the statutory provision for trial by jury 91 applies, in his opinion,
only to cases where execution may be obtained against the assets
of the judgment debtor. He indicated that this case involved a
definite fund and that general execution thus would not issue
against the escrowee.
The majority opinion appears consonant with the modern
theory of practice and pleadings in a merged system. The basic
reason remaining for distinguishing between legal and equitable
causes of action is to determine whether a trial by jury is available.
In the Geddes decision, a complete contractual default by the
interpleaded defendant would have provided plaintiff with a strictly
legal remedy, i.e., damages for breach of contract. Neither a mere
demand for equitable relief 9 5 nor the use of a purely equitable
procedural device such as interpleader, should serve to deny a
defendant, where otherwise available, the fundamental right to a
jury trial.9

Indemnification between tort-feasors.
It is well established that there can be no indemnification
between active joint tort-feasors, and that where a plaintiff chooses
to sue fewer than all tort-feasors, the defendant against whom
judgment is rendered has no right to recover against the others
unless his negligence was such as will be labeled passive by the
92 See Matter of Garfield, 14 N.Y.2d 251, 200 N.E.2d 196, 251 N.Y.S.2d
7 (1964) discussed in 39 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 150 (1964); Pass v. Kramer,
160 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. 1954). But see, e.g., Spiro v. Einzinger, 182 Misc.

120, 50 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Levy v. Niklad, 259 App. Div. 54,
18 N.Y.S.2d 105 (2d Dep't 1940); Clearview Gardens First Corp. v. Weisman, 206 Misc. 526, 134 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
9 Geddes v. Rosen, 22 App, Div. 2d 394, 401, 255 N.Y.S.2d 585, 592
(1st Dep't 1965) (dissenting opinion).
94 CPLR 4101(1).
95

See Syracuse v. Hogan, 234 N.Y. 457, 138 N.E. 406 (1923).

does not affect the right
to a trial by jury when . . . used in actions that involve claims that are
legal." 4 WEzn sTEiN, Kom¢ & MmLas, Naw YORK CIVIL PRActicE 14101.02
(1964).
96 "The fact that the genesis . . . was in equity
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Passive negligence consists in the omission or failure
to perform a non-delegable duty and thus, any fault of commission
cannot be merely passive negligence. °s
CPLR 1007 allows a defendant to implead a third party
"who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's
courts.

claim against him. . .

."

Since the intent of this section was

to allow a liberalization of third-party pleadings,99 1007 should
be construed to mean that any time there is a possible allegation
of passive negligence in the original complaint (and therefore a
possibility that a third party "may be" liable over to the defendant)
a motion to implead should be granted. 100 The third party can
then be brought to trial where, with all the evidence presented,
the line between active and passive negligence may be drawn.
But if the plaintiff alleges direct and active negligence by the
defendant, and if the original complaint cannot reasonably be
interpreted as including an allegation of passive negligence on
the part of the defendant, impleader should not be allowed. 01
In Musco v. Conte,'02 the pleadings asserted that defendant
negligently injured the hand of plaintiff's intestate, and that on
removal to a hospital an anesthetic was so negligently administered
as to cause death. The defendant filed a third-party complaint
for indemnification against the hospital and the attendant who
treated the plaintiff's intestate. The trial court dismissed this
complaint for patent insufficiency, but the appellate division reinstated the third-party complaint, finding that the third-party
plaintiff and defendant were not joint tort-feasors, their wrongs
being independent and their culpability unequal.
It has been held that even though one causing personal injuries is liable for their aggravation by a physician, 10 3 he is not
a joint tort-feasor with the physician. 0 4 The courts have found
o Putvin v. Buffalo Elec. Co., 5 N.Y.2d 447, 158 N.E.2d 691, 186
N.Y.S.2d 15 (1959); McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge, 304 N.Y. 314,
328, 107 N.E.2d 463, 471 (1952). For an extended discussion of the theory
of indemnification see Meriam & Thornton, Indemnity Between TortFeasors: An Evolving Doctrine in the New York Court of Appeals, 25
N.Y.U.L. Ray. 845 (1950); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between
Tort!easors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130 (1932); Note, 28 FORDHAm L. RE:v. 782

(1960).

08 Putvin v. Buffalo Elec. Co., supra note 97, at 456, 158 N.E.2d at 696,
186 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
09 12 N.Y. JUD. COUNCIL REP. 203 (1946).
100See Franklin E. Tyrell, Inc. v. Vahlsing, 193 Misc. 454, 69 N.Y.S.2d
602 (Sup. Ct. 1947). But see Anderson v. Liberty Fast Freight Co., 285
App. 01Div. 44, 135 N.Y.S.2d 559 (3d Dep't 1954).
1 Putvin v. Buffalo Elec. Co., supra note 97, at 455, 158 N.E.2d at 695,

186 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
10222

App. Div. 2d 121, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589 (2d Dep't 1964).

103 Milks v. McIver, 264 N.Y. 267, 190 N.E. 487 (1934).
104Derby v. Prewitt, 12 N.Y.2d 100, 105, 187 N.E.2d 556, 559, 236

N.Y.S.2d 953, 958 (1962).
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two independent wrongs in such a case, and indemnification has
been allowed against the negligent physician.' 0
The allowance of impleader in the instant case was proper
because it was certainly possible (in fact, quite probable) that
the defendant would be found only "passively" negligent as to the
wrongful death action. Even though the complaint did charge
the defendant with actively injuring plaintiff's intestate's hand, it
was reasonable to infer an allegation of "passive" negligence on
the part of the defendant as to the fatal injury. It has been held
that where a defendant "is alleged to be guilty of both active
and passive negligence, impleader of the person claimed to be guilty
of active negligence is proper ....,0o
The decision in Musco is also in accord with the purpose of
third-party practice in that it avoids circuity and multiplicity of
actions by furnishing a method of trial of all issues between the
parties without seriously prejudicing the rights of any party.
Intervention allowed to defend constitutionality of statute granting
partial tax exemption.
Representatives of thirteen railroads sought to intervene 107
as defendants in an action 108 brought to contest the constitutionality
of a statute granting partial real property tax exemptions to
railroads.109 Movant-intervenors urged that they had a substantial
economic interest in the outcome of the action since they had
already realized a substantial tax reduction under the statute.
Plaintiff contested the motion, claiming that the intervenors' interest
was not such a "real interest" as would justify the granting of the
motion. The court, exercising the discretionary power given it by
CPLR 1013, granted the motion to intervene. Stressing the
disastrous economic effect on all the railroads in the state if
plaintiff were successful in invalidating the statute, the court concluded that the railroads had a "real and substantial interest in
the outcome of this proceeding." It was further indicated that
plaintiff would nowise be prejudiced by the granting of the motion;
nor would there be any unusual delay occasioned by the intervention.
To ensure that there would be no delay, the court conditioned
its order by stating that the intervenor could not reopen any
1D See Rizzo v. Steiner, 36 Misc. 2d 701, 233 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct
1962); Rezza v. Isaacson, 13 Misc. 2d 794, 178 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Sup. Ct.

1958).

106 Putvin v. Buffalo Elec. Co., supra note 97, at 455, 158 N.E.2d at 695,
186 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
107 CPLR 1012 (intervention as of right); CPLR 1013 (intervention by
permission).
108City of Buffalo v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 44
Misc. 2d 716, 254 N.Y.S.2d 699 (Sup. Ct 1964).
109N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW §489 a-v; N.Y. STAE FiN. LAW § 54(b).

